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诺瓦东南大学 Pankaj Maskara副教授:Do golden parachutes matter? Evidence from firms that ultimately filed for bankruptcy

([澳门正规博彩十大网站] 发布于 :2018-01-15 )

光华讲坛——社会名流与企业家论坛第 4810 期

 

主 题Do golden parachutes matter? Evidence from firms that ultimately filed for bankruptcy

主讲人诺瓦东南大学 Pankaj Maskara副教授

主持人经济学院 陈耿宣博士

时 间2018年1月17上午9点

地 点澳门正规博彩十大网站【最火爆】_2017年最新注册送彩金_2017博彩送网址大全*柳林校区格致楼918会议室

主办单位经济学院 科研处

 

主讲人简介:

Dr. Maskara is associate professor of finance at Nova Southeastern University in Florida, USA. His current research is concentrated in corporate finance, financial institutions, and event studies. He has published in renowned finance journals like Journal of Financial Economics, Journal of Banking and Finance, Journal of Financial Research, and Quarterly Review of Economic and Finance, among many others. He has also published a book on entrepreneurship.

Currently he is working on several papers focusing on different topics like role of credit unions, effect of institutional infrastructure on FDI, selection bias in event studies, and peer to peer lending. He is also writing a book on innovation, and another on essentials of accounting and finance.

主要内容

This talk is about the efficacy of golden parachutes as an effective incentive mechanism used to identify and recruit high quality CEOs when facing financial distress. We study bankruptcy outcomes of 275 firms and find that hiring CEOs with golden parachutes (GPs) during financial distress is associated with a lower probability of liquidation. In contrast, firms led by incumbent CEOs with GPs are more likely to be liquidated, as are firms led by new CEOs without GPs. Since GPs are nullified during bankruptcy, the observed relationship cannot be attributed to an explicit incentive effect. Rather, we contend that during financial distress GPs help recruit reputable CEOs who, even without explicit incentives, continue to maximize shareholder value due to implicit reputational and career concerns.

 

 


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